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Jones v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 53 (July 3, 2014)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: RIGHT TO ACCESS THE COURT
Summary
The Court determined (1) whether a criminal defendant’s access to the courts can be
restricted by the district court when he or she is challenging a judgment of conviction and
sentence or the computation of time served under a judgment of conviction; and (2) whether
there is an established approach courts should take when restricting the access.
Disposition
District courts have the authority to restrict a litigant’s right to access the court. However,
courts must balance competing interests by following the four-step analysis set forth in Jordan
when determining whether to permanently restrict a litigant’s right to access the court.
Factual and Procedural History
Darryl Jones was convicted for several crimes and sentenced to a total of approximately
51 to 134 years in prison. On appeal, the district court reversed the judgment on some counts and
affirmed the remaining counts. Subsequently, Jones, representing himself, filed a timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his judgment of conviction and
sentence. Jones also filed amendments to his petition, a motion for the production of documents,
and a motion to extend his prison copy limit. The State then filed a consolidated opposition and a
request for vexatious litigant determination. The district court referred Jones to the chief judge
for an official determination, and, later, a cursory order was entered denying all of Jones’s
motions and determining that he was a vexatious litigant. The order restricted Jones’s ability to
file further documents in the district court and stated “that all future filings by defendant in this
matter are referred to the chief judge for review and approval before they may come before this
Department.” The order also stated that Jones’s filings were not made in good faith and were
filed for the sole purpose of harassing the State and district court. At the hearing, Jones was not
represented by counsel, nor was he present; he later filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to
challenge the district court’s order.
Discussion
Under Nevada law, courts can permanently restrict a litigant’s right to access the courts
by using approved procedures to help determine whether to restrict a litigant’s access to the
courts and to narrowly tailor the restrictive order.2 However, courts may not impose a complete
ban on filings by an indigent proper person litigant if the ban prevents the litigant from
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proceeding in original civil actions and criminal cases that sufficiently implicate a fundamental
right.3
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have concluded that courts may issue restrictive orders to
curb repetitive or abusive activities by litigants who are challenging a judgment of conviction
and that such restrictions are necessary and prudent to curb conduct that would impair court
functions and the rights of other litigants. In order to preserve judicial resources and curb
vexatious behavior, this Court concludes, “that the district courts have inherent authority to issue
orders that restrict a litigant’s filings that challenge a judgment of conviction and sentence if the
court determines that the litigant is vexatious.” Because the right to access courts is an important
constitutional concern, courts must carefully balance competing interests to determine if the
restrictive order would limit a litigant’s access to the courts in order to challenge a judgment of
conviction and sentence.
In order to balance the competing interests, district courts should use the following fourstep analysis as stated in Jordan: (1) a litigant must be provided reasonable notice of and an
opportunity to oppose a restrictive order’s issuance; (2) the court must create an adequate record
for review, including a list of the petitions or motions, or an explanation of the reasons that led to
the restrictive order and consider whether there are other standard remedies available and
adequate to curb the abusive litigation; (3) the court must make substantive findings that the
litigant’s actions are frivolous or harassing in nature; and (4) “the order must be narrowly drawn
to address the specific problems encountered and must set an appropriate standard by which any
future filings will be measured.”
Here, the district court failed to provide Jones with reasonable notice of, and an
opportunity to oppose, the restrictive order’s issuance; thus, Jones’s due process rights were
violated. Additionally, the court failed to create an adequate record for review or provide reasons
for its conclusion that a restrictive order was necessary. Finally, the court failed to make
substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of Jones’s actions, and the restrictive
order was not narrowly drawn to address the problem encountered.
Conclusion
The district court did not follow the four-step analysis set forth in Jordan when
determining whether to permanently restrict Jones’s right to access the court. Thus, because the
restrictive order runs afoul of the applicable guidelines, the Court concluded “that the district
court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in designating Jones a vexatious litigant and entering the
restrictive order.” Therefore, this Court grants the petition.
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